A central concept in the Art of War, mastering transformations is a crucial notion in cindynic approaches, based in practice on the reduction of vulnerabilities or conflictualities, the latter depending on disparities of perception and prospective divergences between actors. This notion is of the utmost importance in the age of unrestricted warfare, where the unbridled manipulation of opinions can overturn established balances.
First step: from Lao Tzu to Sun Tzu
Lao Tzu says: “dào gives life, virtue nurtures, matter gives form, shì makes become”. If Qiao and Wang were to explain the notion of shì (勢) to us, they would probably simply reply, with the humor that sprinkles their Great Art of War, that it pertains to the mysterious East. The enigma then becomes more obscure, as Sun Tzu has hacked this concept: if shì is what makes beings or situations become or things happen, then mastering shì, using it to one's advantage, makes it possible to dictate what happens. Shì is the central concept of the Art of War, and Sun Tzu's lethal weapon.
François Jullien is credited with deciphering the notion of shì, which can be translated as “propensity of the situation”: previously, this notion had been totally absent from translations of the Art of War. The Cindynic approach clarifies that shì, for Sun Tzu, is more precisely the mastery of this propensity.
Second step: from Sun Tzu to Cindynics
Georges-Yves Kervern, who Guy Planchette recalls was passionate by strategic thinking, then hacked the notion of shì in the sense of Sun Tzu. Cindynics define the vulnerability of a situation as its propensity to generate damage, which depends in particular on the deficits of the actors: the transformation of a real situation into an ideal situation by reducing deficits leads to a resilient situation.
The cindynic art of operation is therefore based on mastering the propensity of situations. In the same way, Sun Tzu's art is based on a prior transformation, which consists in crafting a dispositive designed to trap eventualities: this ex ante attrition ensures that all subsequent transformations will be in its favor.
Third step: from Cindynics to Relativized Cindynics
Relativized Cindynics are focused on conflictualities: each actor has his own perception of a real situation (his ‘perspective’), and his own assessment of the ideal situation (his ‘prospective’). The very notion of danger is relative: what is a risk for some is an opportunity for others. This leads to the formalization of a set (or ‘spectrum’) of subjective situations characterized by a conflictuality dependent on disparities between perspectives, and divergences between prospectives, with each actor having a propensity to implement a transformation enabling his prospective to be realized.
Conflictuality is defined as the propensity of a spectrum to generate or fuel antagonistic transformations: controlling this propensity relies on reducing the divergences and disparities on which they are based. The shì of Relativized Cindynics, the mastery of conflictualities, is the basis of the art of ‘winning the peace’, a necessity expressed by Pierre de Villiers some ten years ago.
Practical examples: from Azawad to Ukraine
The Tuareg question illustrates the strategic importance of the notions of perspective and prospective: when Serval drove the jihadists out of northern Mali, Bamako should have been urged to agree to construct a political solution respectful of the rights of the people of Azawad.
Russia understood the frustration of Bamako's hawks at not being able to return to Kidal or subcontract the repression of the Tuaregs to Barkhane, and initiated an information campaign focused on the integrity of Mali's territory, relayed by a neo-Africanist network spreading a retro-colonialist discourse designed to degrade the perception of France in Africa.
Little by little, without the institutions or the diplomatic sphere initially noticing, perspectives were shaped in the sub-region, and the Sahelian prospective was transformed, leading ultimately to the ousting of Barkhane and the arrival of Russian mercenaries, who, as promised, were launched against the Tuaregs.
Similarly, Vladimir Putin understood that the collapse of the Soviet empire was driven by the prospective of its citizens, which could be summed up in three words: “we want out”. It is logical that he then manipulated the perspective of the Russian people, not hesitating to eliminate recalcitrant journalists and opponents.
As long as this grip on perceptions persists in Russia, it will remain impossible to reduce the prospective divergences between Russia and the West, and in these conditions, apart from enshrining the use of brutal force as the new principle of international order, a peace agreement in Ukraine would be peace in name only.
Art de la guerre. Un hack conceptuel à trois temps